E are all used to thinking about law in terms of the primary rights and duties that obtain in the world at large. One has a right against everyone else not to be punched in the nose or to be run over by a negligent driver. Once these primary rights are violated, a second set of rights and duties can arise out of a judgment or settlement. The victim now has a right to compensation from the tortfeasor. It is tempting to think that there is nothing interesting left to say. A judgment or settlement paid by the tortfeasor to the victim will compensate the victim according to the size of the damages in present value terms and will deter potential tortfeasors in the same proportion. Whether a settlement is paid in a lump sum or periodically should not matter because it is the amount paid that impacts the goals of tort law. This picture is, as Professor Ellen Pryor's Article in this Symposium ably demonstrates, far from adequate.1 How settlements are structured does impact the goals of deterrence and compensation, and lump-sum or "stretched-out" settlements are not equivalent for all purposes, even if they are equal in present value terms. In a lump-sum damage award, the defendant pays the damages to the plaintiff all at once, usually some time shortly after the settlement or judgment. In the three stretched-out methods of damage payout-structured settlements, settlement trusts, and periodic payments mandated by statute-the plaintiff does not receive all of the money up front, but rather in multiple payments over some period of time (measured by a fixed number of years, or the plaintiff's life, or some combination thereof). The stretching out of the payments is meant to constrain plaintiff decisionmaking over consumption of the damage award and so involves adding higher-order decisions that constrain plaintiff's consumption decisions. All of these methods involve the plaintiff and others constraining the decisions of 1953 Virginia Law Review the future plaintiff. (Under a lump sum, the plaintiff is free to choose what to do with the money at any time, which, if consumed, will constrain future plaintiff choice.) If one thinks of the plaintiff as a succession of selves, any of the stretched out methods of paying damages involves an earlier stage of the plaintiff, a judge, or others deciding how future stages of the plaintiff will decide on consumption.
Professor Patricia Danzon found that of various tort reform provisions, only damage caps and abolition of the collateral source rule were associated with a significant reduction in the severity of medical malpractice claims. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy 78 (1985) . 6 See generally Pryor, supra note 1.
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1955 Virginia Law Review Part I will articulate a framework for analyzing methods of paying damages in terms of higher-order decisionmaking and will point out the similarities to other uses of delegating or constraining decisions in spendthrift trusts and in entitlement structures more generally. Part II will examine how current tax and bankruptcy law favor structured settlements, reflecting an apparent policy of subsidizing self-paternalism on the part of plaintiffs. These higher-order self-paternalistic decisions are supposed to constrain the lowerlevel consumption decisions by later stages of the plaintiff. Part III will turn to the question of how current law does or does not give effect to the constraints imposed by the higher-level decision to space out payments of damages. Finally, Part IV will point out some conflicts between effecting self-paternalism and other goals, which have led to an undermining of the effectiveness of structured settlements in encouraging plaintiff self-paternalism.
I. THREE LEVELS OF DECISIONMAKING
In the settlement trust, the structured settlement, and related devices, three levels of decisionmaking are required. First, there is the choice of how the money will be used on a day-to-day basis. Will the money be used for doctor's bills, other bills, gambled away, and so on? Second, there is a second-order choice about the consumption choice: Who will choose (and when) how to use the money? In some cases, a trustee will decide when to pay out to the plaintiff, leaving the day-to-day choice to the plaintiff-beneficiary. In other cases, the distinction between these two choices is less apparent: With a lump sum, the plaintiff will choose now whether to spend or save, in effect choosing whether to delegate the decision to a later stage of herself. Third, there is the choice of who makes the second-order choice: Who will make the choice of who makes the choice of how to use the money? For example, the judge (or the plaintiff) could decide to set up a trust so that a trustee will make the choice of when the plaintiff can make the everyday consumption choices. In this Part, I first illustrate higher-order decisionmaking and delegation in an analogous area-the spendthrift trust. Then I argue that higher-order decisionmaking is a more or less apparent feature of entitlement and liability structures that respond to different distributions of information and other decisionmaking ability. [Vol. 88:1953 [Vol. 88: 1956 Structured Settlements That a settlement trust is an alternative to a structured settlement highlights the aspect of delegated decisionmaking that is familiar in the area of trusts. One type of trust that bears an especially close resemblance to settlement trusts (and structured settlements) is the spendthrift trust. A spendthrift trust is one in which a settlor creates the trust and gives the trustee instructions about paying out to the beneficiary; the trustee can be directed to pay for needs such as maintenance and education only as these needs arise, or the trustee can be given discretion to determine how much (including whether) to pay out to the beneficiary.7 The beneficiary has the choice of how to use each payment only after it is received, but does not have an interest that can be attached by creditors while the funds are still in the trust.8 The beneficial interest is designed not to be assignable or otherwise subject to anticipation and is not part of the estate of a beneficiary in bankruptcy.9 Settlors find the spendthrift trust particularly attractive if they worry about the ability of beneficiaries to manage money rather than fritter it away. Spendthrift trusts in someone other than the settlor have long been permitted in the United States, despite the famous early criticisms of Professor John Chipman Gray. He objected vehemently that creditors might be deceived by the beneficiary's appearance of prosperity into lending to the beneficiary but later be unable to collect on a bad debt by attaching the trust.10 (Chasing the payments as they are made would be prohibitively difficult.) Whether such false appearances were ever a major problem, they are not likely to be a major one in our era of credit checks and digital information technology,1' and Professor Gray's disgust at the idea of the idle plutocracy that he feared spendthrift trusts would promote is not much of a concern in the tort settlement context.12 More pressing problems are whether certain classes of claims against the beneficiary, such as those for child support, alimony, and by victims of the beneficiary's torts, should receive the spendthrift protection; many states do not extend the anti-creditor protections of a spendthrift trust to these sorts of claims.13 Thus, in the somewhat analogous situation of a plaintiff who is the beneficiary of a settlement trust or a structured settlement, future tort creditors of the plaintiff might have a stronger claim on the trust's assets or the annuity than would voluntary creditors. As we will see, another question is the plaintiff's role in setting up a settlement trust or a structured settlement. The greater the plaintiff's role, the more the plaintiff might-unpersuasively, I argue-be analogized to the settlor of a spendthrift trust. Traditionally, spendthrift trusts cannot be used to shield the settlor's own assets from creditors; most states do not extend protection to self-settled spendthrift trusts.14 More recently, however, even such self-settled spendthrift trusts have been permitted by legislation in Alaska and Delaware.15
The settlement trust, one of the three methods of stretching out damage payments, has spendthrift-like limits on payouts for reasons similar to those that appeal to settlors of spendthrift trusts. The structured settlement, another of the three stretched-out damage payout methods, is similar to the spendthrift trust except that 
12
Gray, supra note 10, at vi ("One of the worst results of spendthrift trusts ... is the encouragement it gives to a plutocracy, and to the accumulation of a great fortune in a single hand, through the power it affords to rich men to assure the undisturbed possession of wealth to their children, however weak or wicked they may be.").
3 the schedule of payments is more mechanical, making the trustee's role fall out of the picture. The person setting up the structured settlement (the analog of the settlor of a trust) is, depending on the case, in part the plaintiff-beneficiary who is exercising some selfpaternalism. But unlike in the typical self-settled spendthrift trust, the occasion for the trust and the funding will come not from the plaintiff-beneficiary but from the defendant (in satisfaction of the tort claim, to be sure). As Professor Pryor's Article emphasizes, a major issue in this area is even the extent of plaintiff decisionmaking in choosing a trust or a structure, as opposed to a lump sum.16
Postjudgment rights and duties share this feature of layered decisionmaking with other rights structures, but exhibit more of these levels. In general, structures of rights and liabilities can be thought of in terms of delegated decisionmaking. This is most familiar from torts where there is an argument for placing liability on the "cheapest cost avoider," the party who can gather and act on information about accident avoidance.7 By using strict liability and charging external harm to such a party, that party rather than the court can engage in the choice between incurring prevention costs or accident costs (because the latter will equal expected damages). volves less delegation by requiring the fact finder (jury or judge) to evaluate potential precautionary measures. A delegation of even greater scope occurs with rights that we think of as property. By making someone the owner of an asset, we allow that actor (the "owner") to compare the potential uses of the asset, including transfer at whatever prices are being offered.19 Where the set of uses is open-ended and difficult for the courts and other officials to evaluate, property rights allow for a high degree of decentralized decisionmaking. Much of the law of property rests on a foundation of rules that use very rough proxies that delegate decisions to owners: A boundary, literal or metaphorical, is a proxy for a wide range of uses, among which the owner may choose. The owner is the gatekeeper of the asset and officials need only worry about defending the proxies-such as presence over a boundary line in trespass-that demarcate the scope of the gatekeeper's rights.20 The owner can then contract with others for access to the asset. Within the constraints on the right to exclude-such as the absence of a right to exclude emergency personnel-courts protect the owner in her property, and the owner thus has a sphere of decisionmaking within which she is answerable to herself. This sphere of autonomous decisionmaking for the owner has been particularly emphasized in libertarian theories of property. 
Decisions are delegated to the liable party, and the liable party is in
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Further decisions to modify the basic exclusionary regime occur through self-or judicially-enforced contracts or through "fine tuning" doctrines such as those of nuisance or regulation.22 As in the case of the reasonable-person standard noted above, nuisance involves less delegation to owners than does trespass because officials (here judges) make decisions over proper use directly.23 This decreased delegation would tend to happen when the stakes are high enough, and alternatives to official decisionmaking (such as private contracting) are comparatively costly enough to overcome the advantages of simple decisions delegated to owners.24 What many of these cases of primary rights share is that the court or legislature is making a decision that is second-order: choosing the best chooser. In structured settlements and other post-judgment rights structures, however, it is useful to think of at least three levels of decisions. The three levels are easiest to separate where different actors are making decisions at different levels. Among the three devices with which we are concerned, this is likeliest to be true in a settlement trust. Here the court, aided by the parties and any guardians, chooses a trustee who will then choose when to disburse money to the plaintiff who will then choose how to use it.25 How a choice is made at a higher level can constrain choice at a lower level; sometimes that is the whole point. Thus, for example, the trustee in a spendthrift-type arrangement will choose Stud. 13 (1985) (distinguishing mechanical and judgmental rules in trespass and nuisance, respectively, and attributing difference to higher levels of transaction costs in nuisance-type situations). 24 Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 395-97 (analyzing nuisance as a system of use governance involving greater delineation and communication costs than trespass and explaining additional features of nuisance law not reflecting traditional transaction costs); see also Smith, supra note 19 (proposing framework based on exclusion and governance). 25 If the payment made in a stretched-out payment method might be saved by the (later-stage) plaintiff or put into a new trust, there can be even more levels of decisionmaking.
to give less choice to earlier stages of the beneficiary than if disbursement were all at once. There may be certain things that the beneficiary over time cannot choose (certain investments, gambling, and so on) because the trustee's (or the settlor's) choice makes it prohibitively costly.
II. SUBSIDIZING HIGHER-ORDER DECISIONS
Distinguishing the three levels of decisions will allow an explanation of the favorable treatment of structured settlements in tax and bankruptcy. The favorable tax treatment subsidizes plaintiffs' selfpaternalistic, higher-order choice to forego lower-order choices later on.
Consider the tax advantage to structured settlements. This tax advantage goes beyond the favorable tax treatment of lump-sum tort awards. In the general case, nonpunitive awards to personal injury plaintiffs are not taxable.26 But in the case of a structured settlement, even delayed payments are entirely tax-free.27 This advantage goes beyond the nontaxation of a lump sum, because the proceeds of an invested lump sum are taxed, whereas a structured settlement can build up tax-free prior to withdrawal. The ostensible policy behind the tax break is to avoid situations in which plaintiffs squander large judgments and then wind up without sufficient resources to support themselves and their dependents or to pay for needed medical care.28 The public has some stake in not seeing plaintiffs exhaust a lump sum, particularly where the government will be expected then to provide further support and medical care.29 Congress can be seen as making a bargain on behalf of the public with the plaintiff that in return for the lack of flexibility and choice at the first-order level of decisionmaking, the plaintiff can enjoy an additional advantage of tax-free build-up. As long as defendants do 
Structured Settlements 1963 not manage to appropriate this benefit for themselves (which this Essay addresses later), the plaintiff's lack of autonomy in consumption is the quid for the tax-break quo.30
The structured settlement is not the only area in which a tax preference is given where the concern is that people need extra encouragement to provide for their futures. Retirement saving is heavily subsidized through the Tax Code and is even coerced though Social Security.3' The strongest argument for such carrots and sticks is that people have excessively high discount rates and so will not save enough for retirement.32 Further, there may be some concern that without forced saving people will over-depend on public programs.3 Likewise with structured settlements, where a plaintiff can be regarded as multiple selves and the earlier self will not take the later one's needs sufficiently into account, society may decide to encourage the earlier self to make sure that sufficient resources are available for the later self.34 Such a decision could re- The other great advantage that law bestows on structured settlements is, as already mentioned, their exemption from the claims of creditors and their probable noninclusion in the estate of a tort plaintiff who winds up in bankruptcy.35 By not being reachable in bankruptcy, the future payments in a structured settlement bear a strong resemblance to other streams of payments such as some insurance policies, beneficial interests in spendthrift trusts, and, to some extent, pensions.36 For the courts, the lack of control of the person who will receive the payments is a key to finding them unreachable by creditors in bankruptcy.37 Structured settlements are exempt for similar reasons: The payments are meant for the plaintiff's needs and the plaintiff does not have ownership or other control over the payments in advance.
Again, this treatment can be seen as part of the bargain implicit in the tax subsidy for structured settlements. The subsidy purchases the plaintiff's willingness to forego freedom of disposition, and the public thereby purchases the plaintiff's greater likelihood of being provided with resources and nonreliance on public welfare programs. If so, it makes sense that this public claim might, in effect, have priority over some claims in bankruptcy. As we will see, allowing voluntary creditors access to the settlement in bankruptcy would increase the plaintiff's ability to undo the transaction; for example, a plaintiff could borrow for current consumption (gamsis is consistent with rational choice theory, and discussing the implications of individuals having both a more short-term oriented "child" self and a more long-term oriented "adult" self); Thomas C. Schelling J. 61 (1990) . For an argument that a class of assets even broader than those to which the debtor does not have present access should be unavailable to creditors in bankruptcy, see Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 260-64 (1986). bling or whatever), securing the debt with the expected payments.3 If the lender cannot touch the payments in bankruptcy, such transactions anticipating the payments will become more costly. Putting the settlement funds out of the reach of creditors makes it more difficult for the plaintiff to undo the structure and to thereby defeat the purpose of the subsidy of which he has taken advantage.
Not including a structured settlement in a bankrupt's estate can be viewed as an advantage or a disadvantage. Ex post, a plaintiff in bankruptcy would prefer not to lose the settlement. Before bankruptcy, a plaintiff might decide that he would like to alienate the right to the settlement payments. And, even earlier, at the time of the decision between a lump sum or a structured settlement, the plaintiff might prefer the structure even if it means losing the flexibility of alienability later on. At this earlier stage, it is not clear at all as a normative matter that structured settlements should receive the tax or special treatment in bankruptcy if the plaintiff did not give up any flexibility. Reducing the flexibility to squander funds is the point of the tax subsidy for structured settlements.
It is also instructive to push the analysis back even further and compare the plaintiff deciding on the type of settlement payout mechanism, on the one hand, with an uninjured person in otherwise similar circumstances on the other. Almost by definition, the tort victim did not choose to be injured. In this case, we might say that a sort of "realization requirement" comes into play. That is, one's body, safety, and human capital are assets one owns, which are protected by tort law. In the case of an ordinary non-self asset, selling the asset is a realization event (in the tax sense), and tax on any gain (or potential deduction of losses) happens then. Without a voluntary transaction, however, we are more reluctant to impose tax: Annual reporting and valuation may be difficult, and one may not have cash on hand to pay the tax.39 Thus in an involuntary context such as a tort recovery, the Tax Code is more generous in its 38 A plaintiff in bankruptcy, however, may not be able to discharge a debt to a settlement purchaser if his intent is to defraud settlement purchasers. treatment of such realizations. For example, in the case of assets like land, a tort recovery is a realization event but one gets the advantage of freely using basis against the recovery.40 In the case of personal physical injury, as mentioned, the Code does not tax compensatory awards at all.
The size of the subsidy element here depends in part on the taxability of what the tort award replaces. The nontaxation of even the build-up on the settlement is less of a subsidy to the extent that it replaces nontaxable imputed income. We can think of the self as an asset, as a stock from which a flow of services gives rise to income. This income can be imputed, as in walking one's dog or cleaning one's house, in which case there is no tax. Or the services can lead to income, for example wages, on which there will be tax. Much of a personal physical injury recovery, however, is for lost wages.4 Whatever the size of this element of subsidy in the tax treatment of structured settlements, the comparison to the situation of a noninjured person helps explain the lack of alienability of the structured settlements. A noninjured person has the intact asset or "stock" from which the flow is expected, but in many cases the value of that stock is hard to measure. For this reason, the person may be able to borrow less against the value of these future flows. Nor can the stock be pledged or alienated because that would conflict with our policies of a fresh start in bankruptcy, and more extreme examples raise the specter of slavery. A plaintiff with a lump sum has more ability to borrow or consume now rather than later than would the corresponding noninjured person. All else being equal, this extra liquidity is a plus, but if there are independent reasons to restrict such transactions, the plaintiff is not losing an ability that a noninjured person freely enjoys.
So putting all these strands together, the Tax 727 (1947), acq., 1948-1 C.B. 2. In a voluntary disposition, basis must be allocated equitably between the disposed and retained portions of the property according to relative value. Treas. Reg. ? 1.61-6(a)  (2001) . 41 Other components of recovery, to the extent that they are allowed, may correlate with lost wages, but this might be an attempt to associate a monetary amount with lost imputed income.
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[Vol. 88:1953 ity and flexibility that come with a lump sum as opposed to one's uninjured self as an asset (and perhaps loses some more flexibility over this amount), in return for a package consisting of favorable tax treatment of the build-up in the fund and protection in bankruptcy. How much flexibility a given plaintiff has foregone will depend on how easily that plaintiff could have borrowed in the uninjured state, and how costly the lack of flexibility under the structure would be is often best known by the individual plaintiff.42 For this reason and out of general respect for plaintiff autonomy, these decisions are within a sphere that is best left to plaintiffs themselves, unless serious incapacity is shown or can be presumed (as in the case of minors). Balancing the costs against the tax advantage is best done by the plaintiff as long as the plaintiff can be informed of those aspects of the decision (the tax and bankruptcy aspects) about which the plaintiff does not have an informational advantage to begin with.
III. CONSTRAINING LOWER-LEVEL DECISIONS
How costly it will be for a lower-level decisionmaker to evade the restrictions put in place by higher-level decisionmakers will depend on enforcement and transaction costs. As long as there is no market in income streams such as those from structured settlements and the plaintiff finds it too difficult to borrow against the stream, the plaintiff must simply wait for the funds to be disbursed. With the rise of a market in financial products, however, and factoring transactions in particular, the plaintiff may acquire the ability to undo the spendthrift aspect of the settlement.43 Financial theory indicates the size of the lump sum to which any given stream of 42 One aspect of the flexibility problem is that plaintiffs opting for the structured settlement run more risk from inflation than would someone who invested a lump sum in equities (or a noninjured person receiving wages). See 
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1968 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 88:1953 income would be equivalent in terms of present discounted value, and often it is only transaction costs that are the main barrier to easy conversion between the one and the other.44 But with the development of financial and related markets, transaction costs are a decreasing barrier to the translation from income stream to lump sum. The alternative to relying on transaction costs is direct enforcement. Relying on transaction costs to prevent undesired alienation is becoming generally less possible. Developed markets in financial products tend to break down the distinction between fixed and contingent payments. Thus, the tax law has long made crucial distinctions between fixed and contingent payments,4 but here too as transaction costs have lowered and markets in financial products have developed, the form of a payment as fixed or contingent is more manipulable and difficult to classify and police for tax purposes.46 Indeed, in both tax and property law, transaction costs themselves can sometimes be regarded as a potential method of enforcement: If frictions prevent undesired adjustment or actions on the part of the regulated actor, the law need not directly act to prevent those actions.47 Property law sometimes uses a combination of direct enforcement and "natural" frictions to prevent opportunistic behavior.48 For example, copyright needed less enforcement in an era in which copying itself was costly and the copy less useful than an original (for example, photocopying an entire book); with 44 Stud. 131, 131-54, 161-69 (2000) .
